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ABSTRACT
Although often assessed at an organizational level, a market-oriented culture is supported by the
attitudes and actions of the organization’s employees. A firm cannot develop a market
orientation strategy without each employee’s active understanding, willingness, and ability to
perform in a market-oriented fashion. Therefore, individual employees must experience a
responsibility to gather and assess the value of market information, and a willingness to share it
with other employees. We surveyed a cross-section of employees at many levels and roles in
different North American financial services organizations. This research identified important
individual level antecedents that organizations must account for when attempting to stimulate
company-wide market-oriented behaviors. These include the fostering of high quality and
matched psychological contracts, modeling of learning strategies by agile learners, and increased
opportunities and time to develop personal ties between customers and employees in diverse
roles within the firm.
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INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANTECEDENTS TO MARKET-ORIENTED
ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION

Market orientation is an important theme in the marketing literature, and there is a
substantial literature on it. Market-oriented firms “seek to understand customers’ expressed and
latent needs, and develop superior solutions to those needs” (Slater and Narver, 1999, p. 1165).
A firm’s market orientation builds upon three dimensions: the organization-wide acquisition,
dissemination, and co-ordination of market intelligence (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993).
The market orientation literature is replete with theoretical and empirical studies
describing the importance of market orientation to firm performance at an organizational level of
analysis (e.g., Farrell, 2000, Han et al., 1998, Jaworski and Kohli, 1993, Narver and Slater,
1990). However, researchers have rarely studied the contribution of individuals. A concentration
on the firm level construct ignores the underlying routines carried out by individuals that develop
and form the orientation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Although researchers have viewed these
routines from an organizational level, few consider the actions of individual employees, or
attempt to understand the social-psychological drivers of market orientation within a firm (e.g.,
Farrelly and Quester, 2003, Jones et al., 2003).
Narver (1990) suggested firm market orientation requires internalization of core
customer-oriented values by individual employees. A psychological contract represents
exchanged promises between employee and employer and is a key mechanism in this
internalization process. To explain, when employers promise stable employment, and promotion
and development opportunities, employees reciprocate by promising to take actions to fulfill core
values expressed by the company, including market-oriented actions. Rousseau (1995) maintains

that individuals voluntarily enter into a psychological contract, and choose whether they will
fulfill a promise or obligation. However, although there may be a voluntary element about the
process, a feeling of “obligation” implies no choice for a conscientious person. When employees
initiate market-oriented actions, they are likely to internalize market-oriented values through a
process of cognitive dissonance and routine (Festinger, 1957, Salancik, 1977). Cognitive
dissonance occurs when a person’s beliefs and feelings are inconsistent with their behaviors.
Consequently, tension or dissonance occurs that can only be resolved by aligning these
perceptions. If behaviours are not market-oriented, yet employees feel obligated to be marketoriented, then the employees are likely to reframe their belief so that they rationalize why they
are, in fact, not obligated to be market-oriented.
Individuals contribute to organization level market-orientation through actions such as
fostering internal and external relationships (Helfert et al., 2002), and communicating tacit
knowledge (Darroch and McNaughton, 2003). This research adapts the organizational level
definition of market orientation provided by Kohli and Jaworski (1990) to the individual; that is,
the market orientation of individuals reflects the attitudes and behaviors of employees as they
acquire, share, and respond to market intelligence. In order to develop a market orientation
strategy, firms must convince employees to “buy-into” the concept (Piercy et al., 2002). If
organizations are unable to build awareness, ability, and motivation to act in market-oriented
ways, they may face employee resistance to market-oriented initiatives causing an inability to
effectively implement strategy (Harris, 2002).
A firm’s market orientation depends upon obligations of market-oriented behaviors
shared by management and its employees. Employees acquire information about customers and
competitors, and share it with others within the same firm (Darroch and McNaughton, 2003).
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Thus it is important to understand individual and interpersonal variables that enhance the
exchange of knowledge within the organization. Unwritten role obligations are communicated
through relationships between employer and employee, and are often studied within the
theoretical framework of the psychological contract (Rousseau, 1989). Accordingly, Rousseau
(1998, p. 668) notes that “individual beliefs comprising the contract involve sets of reciprocal
obligations – not expectations alone – to which both the individual and the other party are
believed to have committed themselves…Although obligations are a form of expectation, not all
expectations held by a person need to be promissory or entail a belief in mutuality or reciprocity.
By definition, a psychological contract must be based upon a belief that a reciprocal exchange
exists which is mutually understood.”
Employees may be unwilling to act in market-oriented ways if they perceive an
organization to contribute at a low level or less than the employee expects, given the employees’
own contributions to the psychological contract. For example, by being reluctant to be involved
in organizational decision-making processes (Paul et al., 2000), or hoarding market information
in anticipation of self-employment or for employment opportunities with competitors (Harris and
Ogbonna, 2001). Additionally, employees may not feel obligated to develop strong customer
relationships if they believe that in general the company does not fulfill its obligations
(Eddleston et al., 2002). Thus, this research considers how market-oriented behaviors may be
shaped by mutual obligations within the psychological contract between the employee and
employer.
Although popular with psychologists, the study of psychological contracts is largely
overlooked by researchers in the marketing field. Notably, only a few articles exist that apply
the theory of psychological contracts in the context of marketing activity within the firm.
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(specifically, Blancero et al., 1996, Blancero and Johnson, 2001, Eddleston

et al., 2002,

Llewellyn, 2001). Few of the marketing studies develop the role of psychological contracts from
the perspectives of employees across the organization, preferring to focus on those with close
customer contact, such as sales. This study extends empirical knowledge of marketing
orientation from the opinions of senior level marketing or quality control managers (e.g.,
Kennedy et al., 2002) to other front-line employees. It contributes knowledge gained from social
psychology to the marketing field.
First, this paper reviews the literature on employee psychological contracts. Then we
present and explain hypotheses relating employee perceptions of the psychological contract,
learning orientation, and role-based customer interaction to perceptions of their own marketoriented behaviors. These relationships are tested and discussed in a cross-sectional survey of
financial services employees. Finally, we discuss the implications, limitations and contributions
of the research to the marketing field.

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANTECEDENTS TO INDIVIDUAL MARKET-ORIENTED
BEHAVIORS
Previous market orientation research at the individual level has focused upon either a
customer-oriented disposition (e.g., Brown et al., 2002) or alternatively on various individual
level antecedents or outcomes of a market orientation strategy (e.g., Celuch et al., 2000). This is
problematic because the customer-oriented disposition narrowly targets the customer and does
not identify trainable actions. The other stream identifies important individual level issues, but
does not test them in the context of market-oriented behaviors performed by each employee. To
fill the void, this research examines selected antecedents to individual market-oriented behaviors.
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At the organizational level, researchers relate market orientation to learning orientation
(Baker and Sinkula, 1999), to channel relationships (Langerak, 2001, Siguaw et al., 1998), and to
inter-functional differences (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). These contributing factors at an
organizational level provide some rationale for further investigation at an individual level
because an organization collectively reflects the values and actions of individuals it employs.
Consequently, this research tests individual level constructs related to learning orientation,
channel relationships, and inter-functional differences. Specifically, we posit several reasons for
market-oriented actions at the individual level, based upon individual learning agility, the
psychological contract, and role-related differences in the level of customer contact.

Developing Market Orientation Obligation within Psychological Contracts
The psychological contract explains how role obligations shared by the employee and
employer can shape the employee’s market-oriented practices. “The psychological contract is
individual beliefs, shaped by the organization, regarding terms of an exchange agreement
between individuals and their organization.” (Rousseau, 1995, p. 34). These beliefs reflect the
promises made, accepted, and relied on between themselves and another (employee, client,
manager, organization). Here, the concept of psychological contract obligations is extended to
consider employee perceptions of their own market-oriented obligations.
The psychological contract envisions the exchange of promises between employee and
organization. The organization provides inducements in the form of wages, fringe benefits,
nature of the job, and working conditions (March and Simon, 1958). These inducements are
realized when employers fulfill their obligations, and can be differentiated from anticipated or
future obligations (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002). Obligations require that the employee trust the
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employer to deliver them at some point in the future. When that trust is present, the employee
responds with increased involvement (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002, Paul et al., 2000).
Psychological contracts can be transactional (characterised as usually extrinsic, shortterm, static and specified) or relational (intrinsic, long-term, dynamic and open-ended). This
paper focuses upon relational contracts because the long-term nature of relational psychological
contracts permits a focus upon long-term strategic implications for firm-value. Employees who
experience a fulfilled relational contract are less likely to seek employment elsewhere
(Cavanaugh and Noe, 1999). Anderson and Schalk (1998) described renewed research interest in
the psychological contract, noting that the contract has become more flexible and unstructured.
Employees must assume responsibilities, previously considered to be outside of normal role
obligations, related to innovation, entrepreneurship, training, and career development. Integral to
these new contract promises is a heightened awareness of the need to manage market
information.

Psychological Contract Quality and Reciprocity
Rousseau (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998, p. 681) defined the psychological contract as
“an individual’s belief in the reciprocal obligations arising out of the interpretation of promises”.
This definition reflects development of “exchange agreement”, (Rousseau, 1995) to more clearly
reflect reciprocity in the psychological contract. This research uses Rousseau’s conception of a
psychological contract anchored with strong promises and obligations instead of implied
expectations. These entail greater engagement in the contract, make it less likely for employees
to tolerate a situation of inequity, and thus increase the salience of reciprocity (Guest, 1998).
Applied to the psychological contract, the norm of reciprocity would suggest that when one party
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(A) fulfills a promise made to the other party (B), party B feels obligated to reciprocate by
fulfilling their promises to party A1. For example, when an employer fulfills a perceived promise
to share information with an employee, the employer creates a reciprocal obligation, so that the
employee is more likely to respond by fulfilling a perceived promise to share information. This
fulfillment of promises, combined with the object of the action, (sharing information with each
other) demonstrates market orientation resulting from the psychological contract.
A psychological contract is a key mechanism in the internalization of core customeroriented values by individual employees. To explain, when employers promise stable
employment, and promotion and development opportunities, employees reciprocate by
promising to take actions to fulfill core values expressed by the company, including marketoriented actions. Rousseau (1995) maintains that individuals voluntarily enter into a
psychological contract, and choose whether they will fulfill a promise or obligation. However,
although there may be a voluntary element about the process, a feeling of “obligation” implies no
choice for a conscientious person.
The principle of reciprocity also supports the notion of equity or fairness, that is, the
expectation of an “equal” give and take creating a balanced equity ratio (Adams, 1965). “In the
relationship between employer and employee, mutual obligations are the central issue”
(Anderson and Schalk, 1998, p. 640). To demonstrate, a longitudinal study involving four waves
of data indicated that new hires’ perceptions of their own commitments were influenced by their
perceptions of the commitments of their employer (de Vos et al., 2003).
A matched contract indicates a match between the perceived promises of each party.
However, this might mean that neither party places much value on the relationship. Although it
is matched, it is not a very successful relationship over the long-term. If neither party values the
1

We’d like to thank the reviewer for this suggested wording.
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relationship, then they will not expend energy to make it successful. Instead, they may channel
their energy away from this relationship to other more fruitful endeavors. Therefore, a high
quality, matched contract might better represent a successful relationship. Supporting this, Shore
and Barksdale (1998) found that contracts involving a high level of obligations from both parties
were related to greater perceived organizational support, commitment and intent to remain with
the organization.
A high-quality relationship requires a foundation of trust (e.g., Flaherty and Pappas,
2000, Lewicki and Bunker, 1996, Robinson, 1996) and has been connected to market orientation
in customer relationships (Helfert et al., 2002) and manufacturer-retailer relationships (Bigne
and Blesa, 2003). Trust supports the willingness of the employer to delegate to the employee
thereby creating an atmosphere of increased autonomy. When given autonomy, employees are
more likely to act in market-oriented ways (Harris and Piercy, 1999).
The psychological contract can also be connected to market orientation when fairness,
trust, and fulfilled employee expectations create higher organizational commitment (Guest and
Conway, 1997). Research links commitment to employee knowledge sharing attitudes and
behaviors (Hislop, 2003), and more specifically, to firm level market-orientation (Zhang et al.,
2004). Recent empirical work, both quantitative (Dabos and Rousseau, 2004) and qualitative
(Llewellyn, 2001), demonstrates this link between employee knowledge sharing and shared
expectations of reciprocity. The qualitative study, conducted in a large telecommunications
company, found that matched (reciprocal) psychological contracts encouraged the provision of
internal customer services whereas unmatched contracts detracted from the service offering
(Llewellyn, 2001). These arguments and research support the following hypothesis:
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H1: Employee perceptions of high quality and matched employer obligations and
employee obligations in the psychological contract, will be related to employee marketoriented behaviors.

Learning Orientation
At the organizational level, learning orientation has also been connected to market
orientation (Baker and Sinkula, 1999, Farrell, 2000, Liu et al., 2002, Slater and Narver, 1995).
This supports a connection between learning orientation and market orientation at the individual
level because a learning organization is built when individuals interact within the organization
(Cho, 2002), and exchange knowledge (West and Meyer, 1997). Indeed, a learning agility or
mindset has been noted as essential to the evolution of organizations and people (Perkins, 1994,
Williams, 1997).
Farrell (2000) found that top management emphasis and value placed on learningoriented behaviors of individuals developed the learning orientation of a company. This indicates
that organizational learning orientation builds upon the learning agility of individual employees.
An additional source of organizational learning arises as individuals with high learning agility
pursue mastery goals (Bell and Kozlowski, 2002, Cho, 2002) and share their experiences (Levitt
and March, 1988).
An extension of organizational level theory to the market orientation of individuals
reflects the dynamism of the individual learning process. The learning orientation of an
individual (also referred to as “learning agility”) “is characterized by a desire to increase one’s
competence by developing new skills and mastering new situations” (Bell and Kozlowski, 2002,
p. 498). The correct way of acquiring information necessary to complete a task varies with the
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frequency, heterogeneity, and causal ambiguity of a task (Zollo and Winter, 2002). For example,
sometimes it is appropriate to learn by doing, whereas at other times it is more appropriate to
share and to formally record the information. Individuals with a high learning agility tend to
persist in spite of failure, pursue more challenging tasks, and use more complex learning
strategies (Bell and Kozlowski, 2002). Managers who value learning approach key events as
opportunities to learn (Perkins, 1994). Learning agility at the individual level prompts
individuals to set goals based on mastering and obtaining knowledge (Bell and Kozlowski,
2002). This knowledge-seeking disposition supported by goal-setting aids in the completion of
market-oriented tasks, such as acquiring information. Thus we hypothesize that learning and
market orientation are related at an individual level of analysis.
H2: The more employees demonstrate a high learning agility, the more likely they are to
perform market-oriented behaviors.

Role-based Differentiation in Individual Market-Oriented Practices
The varying degree of customer contact experienced by employees in different roles is
anticipated to influence the extent of market-oriented actions. It is pivotal to understanding how
market-oriented behaviors translate throughout an organization. Few previous studies included
such a focus, preferring to target marketing and senior management teams. The few that
considered differences across business functions contrast marketing with operations in
manufacturing firms (e.g., Kahn, 2001) or focus on those with close customer contact in studies
of sales force and customer orientation (e.g., Harris, 2000, Langerak, 2001).
Employees fulfill various roles in organizations. Roles require different skills and
abilities, some narrowly focused, some broad. Therefore, some employees may have access to
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more market information than other employees do, and this shapes their degree of information
generation. Other employees work in coordinating roles that enable them to develop strong interfunctional networks and enhance their response capability. These differences in roles shape
differences in their perceived promises to practice market-oriented behaviors.
In general, the psychological contract has become more flexible and developed a broader
responsibility base (Anderson and Schalk, 1998). However, traditional differences in promises
related to market responsibilities may influence the adoption of a wider contract. For example,
employees who experience varying degrees of customer contact and market exposure may
perceive contract promises differently. Sales people sustain a high involvement with the market
and increased knowledge of market needs through repeated customer contact. In contrast,
internal administrative staff functions may consider themselves quite removed from the external
market, and be unable to relate the meaning of their own roles to market conditions. Managers
may unconsciously support this inference if they emphasize how internal employees with a
market orientation exceed role obligations. In response, internal employees may be more likely
to consider market-oriented behaviors as extra-role, and beyond the promises of their
psychological contracts.
Front-line customer contact and sales employees are more likely to believe that marketoriented behaviors form an expected part of their roles because acquiring and disseminating
market information also form extrinsic (economic) parts of their psychological contracts. For
example, sales people are often compensated through sales commissions that directly relate to
the ability to compete for and meet customer needs. If tasks are viewed as expected in-role
behaviors (duties that are communicated to employees as being integral to specific role
performance), employees are more likely to become more satisfied and committed upon task
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completion (MacKenzie et al., 1998). So, to carry out their core role, sales, marketing and other
employees with high customer contact must actively canvass for market information whether
they feel satisfied or not. The fulfillment of this duty will increase their satisfaction. However,
MacKenzie et al (1998) concluded that only employees who are satisfied with their roles and
committed to the organization are likely to perform extra-role behaviors. Organ (1988) described
organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) as discretionary behaviors that are believed to
directly promote the effective functioning of an organization. Thus, employees in areas such as
finance or operations who are dissatisified or uncommitted are unlikely to perform discretionary
market orientation behaviours.
Additionally, employees who have a high learning agility may be better able to
understand the importance of customers to company success. They may deliberately seek out
customers in order to better understand the needs of the market. In this way, the more that these
employees are exposed to customer needs, the more encouraged these learning agile employees
will be to act in market oriented ways. Thus,
H3a): The more frequent their contact with customers, the more likely employees are to
perform market-oriented behaviors.
H3b): The frequency of customer contact will mediate the relationship between high
learning agility and the performance of market-oriented behaviors.

METHOD
Procedure and Sample
Membership lists from insurance associations accessed on the Internet provided contact
information for a cross-section of employees across more than 50 North American insurance and
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financial services companies. The Canadian sampling frame included members of the Canadian
Life Underwriters Association (CLU) and Life Office Management Association (LOMA). The
U.S. sampling frame included members of the North American Health Underwriters Association
(NAHU), Insurance Accounting and Technology Professionals (IATP), Group Underwriters
Association of America (GUAA), and the Society of Financial Service Professionals (SFSP).
The initial survey response rate was less than 40% so actions were undertaken to
eliminate concerns of potential non-response bias (Lambert and Harrington, 1990). Accordingly,
the response rate was increased by a follow-up email but a number of companies and employees
raised concerns about unsolicited emails, and it was clear that follow-up phone calls would be
intrusive. Thus, out of 814 survey links delivered in two waves via email, the online website
collected 138 useable responses (a response rate of 17%).
In view of the low response rate, the effect of non-responses on survey estimates was
clearly of concern. Wave analysis provides a way to assess response bias (Creswell, 1994). This
analysis assumes that the way that later, second wave respondents answer a survey will be
similar to non-respondents. Building on a method suggested by Lambert and Harrington (1990),
the composition of the complete sample was compared to first and second wave respondents and
(where possible) non respondents in terms of gender, level, region, company. The demographics
of the first group of respondents mirrored the second wave of responses.
Additionally the means of the first wave responses (80 responses) were compared to the
means of the second wave responses (66 responses) for all indicators on the survey. As there
were no significant differences in means, respondents for the first wave and the second wave
very likely belong to the same population. Of interest, the only item that was close to
significance at p=.085 was one of the market orientation items. This item asked whether the
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respondent coordinates his/her activities with others inside the organization. Perhaps the
widespread merger and acquisition activity occurring over this time created slight differences in
how employees in the second wave viewed their desire and ability to internally coordinate
knowledge management.
The response rates of 21% Canadian and 15% U.S. (combined response rate of 17%)
were further explored in correspondence with non-respondents. Emails from non-respondents
provided varying reasons for the decision to abstain. These reasons were generally comparable
between the U.S. and Canadian sample. The two main areas of difference lay in suspicion of
researcher motives (much higher in Canada than the U.S.) and language issues (due to French
speaking non-respondents in Quebec). This suspicion reflects the high level of merger and
acquisition activity faced by the financial services industry in Canada, and was unavoidable
given the nature of an unsolicited email survey. There were also a large number of emails that
were blocked by Internet service providers and by corporate IT departments. Overall, the wide
variety of reasons given for not filling out the survey mitigates concern for systematic nonresponse bias.
The mean age of the sample was between 30 and 55 years of age. Seventy per cent of the
sample were women. The mean tenure with the organisation was approximately five years. More
than ninety per cent of the sample were found in 1) underwriting (60 observations) and 2)
marketing (39 observations) and 3) other (30 observations). There were 29 executives, 49 middle
management, and 60 non-supervisory respondents. More variation existed for contact with
customers than distributors but most respondents maintained some level of contact with
distributors.
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Measures
Scale items for the independent and dependent variables are attached in the Appendix.
Psychological Contract. The state of the psychological contract was measured using a
shorter version of Rousseau’s (1990) widely accepted scale, adapted by Gallo and McNaughton
(2003). In Gallo and McNaughton’s study, participants were asked to 1) rate the extent to which
the employer has made obligations with respect to the participant’s role (12 items, original α =
.8620) and 2) to assess the extent to which the participant has made obligations to the employer
(12 items, original α = .9210) Additionally, two composite validation items that measure the
perceived quality of the employer-employee relationship are used in this study to validate the
results of the first and second sections of the scale.
Psychological Contract Match and Quality. The research considered the influence of four
types of contracts: high quality matched, low quality matched, high quality unmatched, and low
quality unmatched. The influence of these variables was assessed by dichotomizing the data into
values above and below the sample median for the aggregated average of each of the employer
and employee scales. The median ratings for employer commitments (median = 3.83) and
employee commitments (median = 4.33) were calculated. Values above each median indicated
that employees perceived higher quality commitments, relative to the below-median values that
represented lower quality commitments. Additionally, a mismatch in perceived contribution
level, where employers were above and employees were below their respective medians, was
termed “unmatched” when contrasted with match in positioning either above or below the
median (“matched”).
The match and quality in perceived employer and employee commitments to the
psychological contract were measured by separating responses into quadrants. This technique
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considered both the match (between employer and employee commitments) and the quality (the
absolute level of commitments). This comparison is complicated by differing employer and
employee promises, creating different metrics. However, different metrics are necessary because
both parties contribute in different ways to the same contract, forcing employees to cognitively
translate the metrics as they assess the need for reciprocity. Using this approach, other
researchers have found that the combination of high rankings for both employer and employee
contributions to the psychological contract is critical to firm performance (Wang et al., 2003),
employee intention to remain (Shore and Barksdale, 1998), and career advancement (Dabos and
Rousseau, 2004). By separating cases into these quadrants using indicator coding, it is still
possible to evaluate the match between employer and employee commitments. Additionally, a
better understanding of the level of each behavior is achieved.
Individual Learning Agility. Individual learning agility was measured using a 7-item
learning agility instrument adapted from Perkins (1994).
Customer Contact. Customer contact was measured by assessing how often the
participant interacted with both premium payer and distributor customers. The aggregated scale
was dichotomized at the median of the distribution and each respondent’s value was categorized
as either frequent or infrequent.
Market-oriented Behaviors. The market orientation of an individual was measured using
the I-MARKOR, a 20-item, 3 dimensional measure (Schlosser and McNaughton, under review).
Additionally, two composite items assessing general customer focus are used in this study to
validate I-MARKOR.
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RESULTS
Reliability and Validity of Measures in the Model
Cronbach’s alpha for each scale are shown in the Appendix. Reliability for each scale
exceeded minimum standards of α > .70 established by Nunnally (1976). No scale items were
discarded, as the item-to-total correlations were optimal.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (using maximum likelihood) examined the stability
of the theorized factor structure (Hair et al., 1998). Additionally, as the composite market
orientation measure was multi-dimensional, Cronbach’s Alpha was assessed for each dimension
(Flynn and Pearcy, 2001, Hair et al., 1998). As Hinkin (1995) noted, reliability is a precondition for validity. Inter-factor correlations and item-to-total correlations were examined to
guard against multi-collinearity and ensure that the item and factor solution could not be
improved upon. In analyzing actual market-oriented behaviors with CFA, the expected threedimensional model was compared to the two factor model (based on the EFA for market-oriented
obligations), to a single-factor first order model, and to a single-factor second order model with
three dimensions. Fit indices supported a latent construct with three dimensions, with CMIN/df
below 2 (CMIN/df = 1.72), Comparative Fit Index greater than .9 (CFI = .926), and RMSEA less
than .08 (RMSEA = .073), as recommended by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998). The
measurement model demonstrated that market-oriented behavior explained a large amount of the
variation in three factors of information acquisition (IA, r2 =.79), information sharing (IS, r2
=.81), and strategic response (SR, r2 = .48).
Convergent validity was confirmed by strong correlations between 1) the I-MARKOR
measure and validation items measuring general customer focus, and 2) the psychological
contract measures and validation items measuring the perceived quality of the employer-
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employee relationship. Nomological validity was also indicated by strong correlations supporting
theorized relationships. As expected, the data presented in Table 1 indicates moderate but
significant correlations between learning agility and individual market orientation. As no
correlation coefficient exceeded the alpha coefficient of the scale, the scales used in the study
exhibited discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) and used frequently in studies (e.g.,
de Vos et al., 2003, Harris and Ogbonna, 2001).

Modeling Relationships
Using Structural Equation Modeling (AMOS), the paths from the exogenous variables
(learning agility, psychological contract, and customer contact) to the endogenous variable
(market-oriented behavior) tested theorized relationships. To test hypotheses, we aggregated the
I-MARKOR scale into three indicators by averaging the measurement items at the first order
construct level. According to (Matsuno and Mentzer, 2000), aggregation of first order
dimensions is justified because 1) the validity of the second order MO scale with all 20 item
measures has been established; 2) given the sample size, aggregation allows maximization of the
degrees of freedom in estimating the path coefficients between the MO and performance
measures; and 3) it reduces higher levels of random error and retains the three-dimensional scale
of market orientation.

Insert Table 1 about here

21

Antecedents to Market-oriented Behaviors
The structural equation modeled learning as an observed variable, using the average of
the 7 items. The variable CONTACT was an average of the customer and distributor contact
frequencies, using indicator coding of “1” for frequent contact, and “0” for infrequent contact.
The model tested the four quadrants of psychological contract status using 3 dummy variables: 1)
matched low rated contract, 2) unmatched contract, greater employer commitments, and 3)
unmatched contract, greater employee commitments. The high quality, matched relationship
condition was chosen as the referent category because it was the hypothesized condition.
A comparison of the models in Table 2 indicates that the first model (depicted in Figure
1) provides the closest and most parsimonious fit to the data with the greatest explanatory value.
Output shown in Figure 1 indicates an SEM that provided some fit to the data, generating
absolute fit indices close to limits suggested by Hair et al. (1998), with (CMIN/DF = 2.872, p =
.000 although still with higher than desired RMSEA = .117, p = .002). Additionally, the
incremental model fit (CFI = .843) is close to the recommended value of .9, although the
parsimony adjusted measure is lower than desired (PCFI = .602) and indicates that the model
may still be overly complex. This conclusion may be reinforced by the poor RMSEA (which is
also a parsimony-adjusted index). However, simpler models were rejected because they did not
significantly improve model fit, and we wished to retain all variables for reasons of testing the
theory. Previous researchers have cautioned against over-reliance on fit indices (Hu and Bentler,
1995, McDonald and Ho, 2002) and in particular, Curran et al. (2003) suggest that RMSEA may
not be accurate for sample sizes smaller than 200.
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The model explains 29% of the variance in market-oriented behaviors using a sample size
of 138. This indicates that there is sufficient power to provide a confidence rate of 90% (Cohen,
1988). A significant negative effect is noted for a matched low quality contract (r = - .19, p =
.042) and supports Hypothesis One. Significant effects for learning agility (r = .25, p = .004) and
customer contact (r = .42, p = .000) support Hypotheses Two and Three a). However, Table 2
indicates that Hypothesis Three b) is not strongly supported by the fit of Models Two and Three.

Insert Figure 1 about here

DISCUSSION
The Importance of a High-Quality Matched Contract. Study results identified that a low
quality matched psychological contract (relative to a high quality matched contract) significantly
and negatively affected the performance of market-oriented behaviors. This implies that
employers must provide some level of a quality relationship in order to attract market-oriented
behaviors from their employees. Similarly, employees must promise some level of contribution
exceeding the median. Previous empirical research (Harris and Piercy, 1999) support this
because results indicate employees do not perform market-oriented behaviors if there is a
perceived lack of unity and support from upper management.
This finding carries implications for temporary or contract workers who may perceive
low employer and employee commitments to the long-term psychological contract. It is
important because organizations are increasingly outsourcing administration and service through
call centers and contract work. Contract workers are a rich source of market orientation, because
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the impermanence of their employment makes it necessary that they keep their fingers on the
pulse of the market and provide superior services. In order to prompt employees to reciprocate
through the sharing of market information, employers must be prepared to invest in relationships
with temporary workers.
Breach of the psychological contract occurs when employees perceive a difference
between what they were promised and what they received (Morrison and Robinson, 1997).
Although much of the psychological contract literature has focused upon contract breach (e.g.,
Morrison and Robinson, 1997, Pate et al., 2003, Robinson and Rousseau, 1994), the results of
this survey indicate that employee perceptions of lower level obligations of both employer and
employee are also problematic. A matched but low quality psychological contract appears to be
more detrimental than potential inequities originating from discrepancies in the perceived level
of each party’s obligations. Although correlations were in the expected direction (negative in
conditions where the employee perceived low personal obligations), only the matched conditions
were significant.
Learning Orientation. Results highlighted the presence of a significant, albeit moderate
relationship between the learning orientation of individuals and their market-oriented behaviors
(r = 0.25, p = 0.0). This finding is in line with the contentions of previous researchers of
organizational market orientation. For example, Slater and Narver (1995) noted “However, as
important as market orientation and entrepreneurship are, they must be complemented by an
appropriate climate to produce a learning organization.”, and Morgan suggested (2004, p. 22)
“the development of a ‘learning climate’ may be crucial (e.g., a service firm)”. Managers can
develop this climate through the hiring and rewarding of employees who exhibit a learning
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orientation. A strong learning orientation prompts employees to accept and adopt learning
routines introduced by the company.
This finding challenges managers because a significant antecedent of individual marketoriented behaviors in the framework is a trait-based construct (learning orientation). According
to Williams (1997), learning orientation is not a common trait because only 10% of managers are
believed to be agile learners. Our research has identified market-oriented behaviors that
organizations can ostensibly target and train employees to perform. However, if the performance
of the market-oriented behaviors is strongly linked to trait learning orientation, then this will
restrict the options for effective training of market-oriented behaviors in non learning-oriented
employees. Organizations can potentially stimulate these market-oriented behaviors across all
employees through the process of role modeling by agile learners (Wood and Bandura, 1989).
Morgan (2004) suggests that organizational learning transcends the individual because continuity
is established through the development of operating procedures and collective mental models
exist in organizational memory.
Differences in Frequency of Customer and Distributor Contact. The financial services
industry relies upon distributors to reach premium payers. Distributor contact related to market
orientation came up more frequently in analysis than customer contact. The frequency of
customer and distributor contact was the strongest antecedent to the performance of marketoriented behaviors (r = 0.42, p = 0.0). Frequent contact was measured as making contact weekly
or more. This finding indicates that some functions must move beyond traditional notions of inrole duties if they are to become players in the company’s strategy. Unless companies encourage
employees in all areas to understand their customers through frequent interaction, they cannot
pursue a market-oriented strategy. A market orientation strategy will not surpass a marketing
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orientation unless strategy-makers in all areas endorse the strategy by providing employees the
time to develop informal and frequent relationships with customers. This finding challenges
practitioners who complain about internal, often Head Office employees who “live in a tower” to
increase the opportunities for internal employees to interact with the external market.

RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
By analysing the interpersonal mechanics of market orientation, this research refines the
understanding of how organizations can build competitive advantage. A firm strengthens its
competitive advantage through strong employee relationships that increase employee retention
and performance (Eddleston et al., 2002). Recruitment and retention of good employees is
important to the realization of market based assets, such as intellectual and relational capital
(McNaughton et al., 2001), and underlines a need for employee market orientation and
relationship management. Good-quality employee relationships also provide a base to develop
strong customer relationships that foster customer loyalty (Day, 2000), and strong channel
relationships that provide production and distribution advantages (Helfert et al., 2002).
This research seeks to remedy a gap in the current market orientation literature by
increasing understanding of employee perspectives and behaviors. It contributes by testing the
linkage between matched psychological contracts and the accomplishment of market-oriented
behaviors. Such a linkage indicates that more than a top-down market orientation strategy is
required for an employee to perform market-oriented behaviors. Additionally, the employee must
perceive a strong relationship with their employer, expressed through the psychological contract.
In his appraisal of market orientation research, Langerak (2003) concluded that the nature
of the link between organizational market orientation and performance has not yet been
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adequately explained. This suggests that other considerations may shape the success of a marketoriented strategy. This research has described and tested how and why individual employees
may perform market-oriented routines underpinning the market orientation of the organization.
Consideration of individual in the creation of a customer orientation largely been tested
with employees in sales and marketing (e.g., Pettijohn and Pettijohn, 2002). In contrast, we
considered employees throughout the company. Most empirical market orientation studies
gathered information from manufacturing companies, and only recently have studies considered
the service sector (e.g., Gray et al., 2003, Harris and Piercy, 1999, Kennedy et al., 2002).

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This research highlights the difficulty in canvassing lower level employees without
organizational sponsorship of the research. This survey approached financial services
professionals who were members of industry associations, and thus may be employed in more
senior roles within their own organizations. In future research, a sponsoring company would
broaden the type of employee who participates, and increase the sample size and response rate to
the survey. An increased sample size might improve model fit, by decreasing errors of
approximation (signaled by a high RMSEA in the current study). Working with one company
could extend the current study by allowing the collection of survey data at different times,
combating method bias, and permitting longitudinal study of causal relationships. It would also
be of great practical and academic value to gain the insight of “extra-firm” respondents, as
suggested by Harris (2003).
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Future researchers might consider the influence of mentoring on employee learning
orientation and the performance of market-oriented behaviors. Employees’ beliefs that their
managers expect and model market-oriented behaviors will prompt employees to practice similar
market-oriented behaviors. For example, Jaworski and Kohli (1993) found that top management
emphasis develops the market orientation of a company. In a related line of inquiry, Farrell
(2000) concluded that top management emphasis and value placed on learning-oriented
behaviors developed the learning orientation of a company. Co-worker behaviors are linked
empirically to individual workplace behaviors, for example, coworker organizational citizenship
behaviors influence individual levels of organizational citizenship behavior (Bommer et al.,
2003). In spite of this direction, there has been little study of modeling in the market orientation
literature. A recent article (Jones et al., 2003), considered social exchange and leader influence
on employee market-oriented behavior, but findings were inconclusive. Modeling offers a rich
venue for future research into the transference of market-oriented behaviors throughout the
organization.

CONCLUSION
Although often assessed at an organizational level, a market-oriented culture is supported
by the attitudes and actions of the organization’s employees. A firm cannot develop a market
orientation strategy without each employee’s active understanding, willingness, and ability to
perform in a market-oriented fashion. Therefore, individual employees must experience a
responsibility to gather and assess the value of market information, and a willingness to share it
with other employees.
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This research identified important individual level antecedents that organizations must
account for when attempting to stimulate company-wide market-oriented behaviors. These
include the fostering of high quality and matched psychological contracts, modeling of learning
strategies by agile learners, and increased opportunities and time to develop personal employeecustomer relationships throughout the firm.
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APPENDIX
Scales Used in the Study
Learning Agility α = .7191
1. I can better understand and deal with situations that present difficulties or new challenges
if I try out new concepts and skills.
2. I adjust or change my approach to learning to match new situations or content that arise
in different learning settings
3. I will make and defend judgments about new situations or challenges that may challenge
the consensus of others
4. I adjust new learning to complement prior knowledge
5. I see ways in which current knowledge can be effectively applied to other, seemingly
unrelated situations
6. I willingly take an active role in meeting and effectively dealing with issues arising from
new situations
7. I construct mental models or knowledge maps of information learned from feedback,
successes or failures
Psychological Contract
A. Consider your relationship with your current employer. To what extent has your
employer made the following commitment or obligation to you? α = .9586
1. Concern for my personal welfare
2. Opportunity for career development within this firm
3. Secure employment
4. Be responsive to my personal concerns and well-being
5. Developmental opportunities with this firm
6. Wages and benefits I can count on
7. Make decisions with my interest in mind
8. Advancement within the firm
9. Steady employment
10. Concern for my long-term well-being
11. Opportunities for promotion
12. Stable benefits for employees’ families
B. To what extent have you made the following commitment or obligation to your
employer?
α = .9043
1.
2.
3.
4.

Make personal sacrifices for this organization
Seek out developmental opportunities that enhance my value to this employer
Remain with this organization indefinitely
Take this organization’s concerns personally
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5. Build skills to increase my value to this organization
6. Plan to stay here a long time
7. Protect this organization’s image
8. Make myself increasingly valuable to my employer
9. Continue to work here
10. Commit myself personally to this organization
11. Actively seek internal opportunities for training and development
12. Make no plans to work anywhere else
Psychological Contract Validation
1.
2.
3.
4.

In general, my employer has not lived up to its promises (REVERSE CODE)
Overall, my employer has fulfilled its commitments to me
In general, I don’t live up to my promises to my employer (REVERSE CODE)
Overall, I am satisfied in my job

I-MARKOR α = .9409
Information Acquisition α = .9250
1. I ask distributors to assess the quality of our products and services.
2. I interact with agencies to find out what products or services customers will need in the
future.
3. In my communication with distributors, I periodically review the likely effect of changes in
our business environment (e.g., company mergers and acquisitions) on customers.
4. I take responsibility to detect fundamental shifts in our industry (e.g., competition,
technology, regulation) in my communication with distributors.
5. I talk to or survey those who can influence our customers’ purchases (e.g., distributors).
6. I review our product development efforts with distributors to ensure that they are in line with
what customers want.
7. I participate in informal “hall talk” that concerns our competitor’s tactics or strategies.
8. I collect industry information through informal means (e.g., lunch with industry friends, talks
with trade partners).
Information Dissemination α = .8864
9. I participate in interdepartmental meetings to discuss market trends and developments.
10. I let appropriate departments know when I find out that something important has happened to
a major distributor or market.
11. I coordinate my activities with the activities of coworkers or departments in this organization.
12. I pass on information that could help company decision-makers to review changes taking
place in our business environment.
13. I communicate market developments to departments other than marketing.
14. I communicate with our marketing department concerning market developments.
15. I try to circulate documents (e.g., emails, reports, newsletters) that provide information on
my distributor contacts and their customers to appropriate departments
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Co-ordination of Strategic Response α = .8370
16. I try to bring a customer with a problem together with a product or person that helps the
customer to solve that problem.
17. I try to help distributors achieve their goals.
18. I respond quickly if a distributor has any problems with our offerings.
19. I take action when I find out that customers are unhappy with the quality of our service.
20. I jointly develop solutions for customers with members of our customer / advisor relationship
team.
Customer Focus Validation
5.
6.
7.
8.

I am primarily interested in satisfying my company’s customers
I am primarily interested in satisfying the customers who sell my company’s product
It will help me do my job if I better understand my company’s distributors
It will help me do my job if I better understand the distributors who sell my company’s
products
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TABLE 1
Correlations between Variables in the Model
1
1. Low quality employee, low
quality employer psych contract
2. High quality employee, low
quality employer psych contract
3. Low quality employee, high
quality employer psych contract
4. Learning Agility
5. Market oriented Behaviors
6. Information Acquisition
7. Information Dissemination
8. Co-ordination of Strategic
Response

2

3

1

-.257(**)

-.287(**)

-.204(*)

-.267(**)

-.257(**)

1

-.126

-.082

-.287(**)

-.126

1

-.204(*)
-.267(**)
-.177(*)
-.286(**)

-.082
.031
.019
.010

-.254(**)

.070

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

4

5

6

7

8

-.177(*)

-.286(**)

-.254(**)

.031

.019

.010

.070

-.015

.095

.064

.089

.111

-.015
.095
.064
.089

1
.320(**)
.311(**)
.252(**)

.320(**)
1
.921(**)
.898(**)

.311(**)
.921(**)
1
.728(**)

.252(**)
.898(**)
.728(**)
1

.261(**)
.749(**)
.561(**)
.556(**)

.111

.261(**)

.749(**)

.561(**)

.556(**)

1

FIGURE 1
Market-oriented Behaviors with Hypothesized Relationships

Low Quality
Unmatched
Contract

Low Quality
Matched
Contract

.11

-.19

High Quality
Unmatched
Contract

Customer
Contact

-.05

Learning
Agility

.42

Market
Orientation

.25

.85
.84

Information
Acquisition

Information
Dissemination

.64

Strategic
Response

CMIN/df = 2.872
CFI = .843
PCFI = .602
RMSEA = .117 p = .002
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TABLE 2
Fit Indices
Model
Model 1 all
direct paths
Model 2
complete
contact
mediation
Model 3 partial
contact
mediation
Model 4 no
contact
Model 5 no
learning
orientation
Model 6 no
psychological
contract
Model 7
including
country of
residence

R2
.29

CMIN/df
2.872

CFI
.843

PCFI
.602

RMSEA
.117 p=.002

.28

3.202

.816

.583

.127 p=.000

.31

2.912

.848

.575

.118 p=.002

.14

3.868

.748

.561

.145 p=.000

.28

3.150

.811

.608

.125 p=.000

.25

2.872

.820

.673

.117 p=.001

.29

2.997

.784

.470

.121, p = .000
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